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   1 
ABSTRACT 
 
There  are  many  different  reasons  behind  cooperation  between  firms  and  many 
possible interpretations are assumed to be based on an assessment of endogenous 
benefits of collective action directly generated by taking part in a joint project. 
This paper attempts at verifying the interpretative capacity of models analysing the 
cooperation between firms using not only technological or organisational factors 
and  rivalry  between  firms,  but  also  some  proxy  variables  of  social  capital,  of 
experience  accumulation  in  collective  action  and  of  institutional  capacity  for 
initiative. The specific aim of our work is hence that of providing an interpretation 






There are many different reasons underlying inter-firm cooperation. Some authors 
include  risk  reduction  (Aloysius  1999),  collusion  (van  Wegberg  1995),  and 
preventing outflow of technological externalities (Spence 1984, Katz 1986). Other 
researchers emphasise the enhancement of tacit knowledge and complementarities 
in resources, (Kogut 1988, Buckley and Casson 1996, Greunz, 2005), strengthening 
the  economic  networks  (Katz  e  Shapiro  1986;  Economides  1996,  Ruuskaneen, 
2004),  the  reduction  of  transaction  costs  (Pisano  1990;  Narula  1998)  and  scale 
economies exploitation (Contractor and Lorange 1988). Although there are many 
possible interpretations of cooperation decisions, these are widely assumed to be 
based  on  an  assessment  of  endogenous  benefits  of  collective  action  directly 
generated by taking part in a joint project. 
On the other hand, it is seldom mentioned that cooperation and defection payoffs 
can  be  modified  by  exogenous  factors.  These  include  company  legislation, 
monopoly policies, social capital endowment and other types of incentives provided 
                                                            
1 We would like to thank Giovanni Anania, Domenico Cersosimo, Vincenzo Dall’Aglio, Andrea Lasagni, 
Stefano Magagnoli, Mario Menegatti, Rosanna Nisticò, Gilberto Seravalli and Gulielmo Wolleb for comments 
on an earlier version of this paper.   2 
by institutions and traditional forms of economic associations 2. In other terms, we 
can observe with Taylor (1987) that, as well as internal solutions, collective action 
has to take into account external solutions based on variables acting “by changing the 
game,  that  is,  changing  people’s  possibilities,  attitudes  or  beliefs”(p.  22).  The  spread  of 
cooperation between firms thus depends on both the existence of positive expected 
benefits that are generated by the resources assigned to common project and the 
variables originating outside the cooperation itself. 
This paper attempts at verifying the interpretative capacity of models analysing the 
cooperation between firms using not only technological or organisational factors 
and  rivalry  between  firms,  but  also  some  proxy  variables  of  social  capital,  of 
experience  accumulation  in  collective  action  and  of  institutional  capacity  for 
initiative. The specific aim of our work is hence that of providing an interpretation 
of Italian inter-province differentials in the propensity of inter-firm cooperation. 
The  article  develops  as  follows.  Section  Two  analyses  the  relationship  between 
collective  action  and  technological  and  organisational  variables.  Section  Three 
introduces and discusses the issue of social capital. Section Four assesses the role of 
institutional  factors  and  accumulation  of  experience  of  collective  action  in  the 
economic environment. Sections Five and Six discuss the methodology and show 
the results of empirical verifications measuring the interpretative capacity of these 
hypotheses.  
 
2.THE ROLE OF TECHNOLOGICAL AND SIZE VARIABLES  
Technological  externalities  play  a  role  of  paramount  importance  in  start-up  and 
interruption of cooperation between firms. The more rivalry between firms is based 
on innovation, the more results of competition are affected by the extent to which 
research and innovation can be appropriated (Arrow 1962). Innovative firms are 
often  facing  considerable  hardships  in  protecting  their  own  innovations  and 
                                                            
2 This approach is recognised more or less explicitly in works which emphasise the importance of state – civil 
society relationships in the development of collective action and production of public goods (Evans 1995; 
Evans  1996;  Heller  1996;  Ostrom  1996;  Kenworthy  1997;  Stiglitz  1998;  Narayan  1999;  Das  Gupta, 
Grandvinnet and Romani 2000; Petro 2001). It is also used in work which focuses on the role of institutions 
in coordination problem solving (Cooper  1999 ; Arrighetti and Seravalli 1999a; Arrighetti and Guenzi 2000). 
Also in work analysing the relationship between social capital and cooperation (Putnam 1993a and 1993b; 
Helliwell and Putnam 1995, Helliwell 1996; Humphrey and Schmitz 1996; Barr 1997) and in the relationship 
between institutional context, legislation and trust creation between economic actors (Lane and Bachmann 
1997).    3 
retaining the benefits of investment in R&D. Indeed, in many cases, the innovation 
can be imitated at petty costs, and competitors widely benefit from spillover positive 
externalities in technological factors (Spence 1984; Katz 1986; Reinganum 1989). If 
chances  of  protecting  the  innovation  are  limited,  this  significantly  reduces  the 
incentives to innovate, affecting the accumulation of  technological know how of 
whole industries and, indirectly, the technological potential of regions.  
In such context, firm cooperation can be an important instrument to internalise 
technological externalities and re-establish adequate incentives for investments in 
R&D (Katz and Ordover 1990; Kamien et al. 1992; Colombo 1998; Branstetter and 
Sakakibara 2000).  The readiness of formal organizations to regulate the collective 
action between competitors, with the aim of monitoring joint research project and 
of innovation benefits’ redistribution, can reduce the spontaneous firms tendency to 
decrease investments in research (Levin e Reiss 1988). 
Cooperation  between  firms  is  also  associated  with  uncertainty  (Bureth,  Wolff  e 
Zanfei  1997).  In  industries  characterised  by  frequent  and  unpredictable  demand 
variations and by technology shifts, even large firms face difficulties in increasing 
internal  resources  without  negative  effects  on  efficiency  levels.  An  increase  in 
organisational and running costs linked to uncertainty increase  accentuates, at least 
in the short – medium term, the managerial constraint, making more advantageous 
to adopt relatively simple forms of organisation such as alliances, rather than vertical 
integration 3. 
The  same  conclusions  are  reached  where  technical  progress  is  based  on  the 
development of tacit knowledge. A firm wishing to acquire a technology with a clear 
tacit component  has inevitably significant difficulties in market transactions, as the 
only alternative to internal production is that of acquiring rights of control over the 
innovative firm. Often the benefits of new technologies are anyhow cancelled out or 
significantly lowered by the increase in running costs of the firm taken over. It is 
hence more efficient to form a cooperative structure (such as a joint venture or a 
consortium) in order to share tacit knowledge resources supplied by firms having 
mutual benefits from their synergies. In other words, “the main reason why firms engage 
in collaborative ventures is the desire to combine their own specific assets and core competencies with   4 
others which are possessed by other firms and cannot be reproduced autonomously” (Colombo 
1998, p.11). 
The presence of technological externalities, uncertainty and tacit knowledge appears 
to  encourage  collective  action  between  firms.  Industries  largely  characterised  by 
these  factors  (such  as  research  intensive  industries  and  industries  where 
technological  innovation  influences  competition)  will  hence  develop  a  higher 
propensity  to  cooperation  (Staber,  2007).  Vice  versa,  sectors  using  consolidated 
technologies and less subject to demand uncertainties should have lower incentives 
to adopt collective action. 
As emphasised by Kay et al. (1987), propensity to cooperation can also vary with 
firm size and market concentration degree. Larger firms tend indeed to have more 
knowledge resources than smaller ones, thus the ability to realize cooperation with a 
broad range of partners. They are also generally longer established that average, and 
have been able to accumulate more tacit knowledge over their lifetime. They hence 
become more attractive for alliances with other firms not possessing such resources, 
so  that  as  company  size  increases,  so  does  the  probability  of  joint  action  and 
collective project being undertaken. 
We  can  finally  state  that  where  there  is  a  relatively  high  level  of  market 
concentration, the development or acquisition of new technologies through internal 
growth  or  acquisitions  can  break  the  oligopoly  balance.  As  concentration  and 
company size increase, there is an increasing incentive for organisational solutions 
such as inter-firm alliances and  stable forms  of cooperation  not altering  market 
shares. 
 
3. THE ROLE OF SOCIAL CAPITAL  
There  is  plenty  theoretical  and  empirical  literature,  much  of  it  produced  in  the 
1990s, which confirms that collective action, in  business and other areas, depends 
to a great extent on the accumulation of social capital (Putnam 1993a and 1993b; 
Fukuyama 1995; Helliwell 1996; Humphrey and Schmitz 1996; Wilson 1997, Staber, 
2007, Cooke et al., 2005, Krishna, 2008). Social capital is based on civic engagement 
and  is  expression  of  adherence  to  the  norms  of  community  life,  such  as 
                                                                                                                                                                          
3 A further type of uncertainty concerns quality of input into the production process. See Buckley and Casson   5 
participation in elections, the respect of public goods, maintenance of traditions and 
community  identity  (Kenworthy  1997).Civicness  increases  social  capital  as  it 
encourages  personal  interaction,  increases  information  on  the  degree  of 
trustworthiness of the individual and thus consolidates generalised trustworthiness 
(Putnam  1993b).  At  the  same  time  networks  of  civic  involvement  provide 
significative relational goods such as contacts, information and reputation. These are 
goods which can only be kept if the individuals stay within community relationships.  
The spread of civicness reduces the issue of opportunism because, when collective 
action is realised in a context of personal relationships and social networks, it is 
more likely that commitment will be respected as the sanction for defection can be 
the exclusion from the social network. These community goods are thus important 
in safeguarding relationships of trust and constitute an important incentive against 
defection  
It is however uncertain whether the same conclusions can be drawn for cooperation 
between firms. It is observed, in fact, that both nature and role of social capital in 
collective action are different as we consider individuals or firms.  For individuals, 
social capital is defined or measured in terms of social integration or generic sharing 
of civic values such as “participation in the local community, proaction in  social context, 
feelings of trust and safety, neighborhood connections, connections with family and friends, tolerance 
of diversity, value of life and work connections” (Onyx and Bullen quoted in Woolcock and 
Narayan 2000, p. 241), but its analytical usefulness in interpreting collective action is 
limited. 4. 
The  definition  offered  by  network  analysis  appears  to  be  equally  unsatisfactory.  
Being at the centre of a complex network of personal relationships can provide big 
advantages in terms of access to information and arbitration (Burt 1997). But it is 
not easy to see how a numerical increase in relationships in itself can help to solve 
problems of cooperation. Collective action in fact is usually hindered, not helped,  
by increasing numbers of participants5. 
                                                                                                                                                                          
(1996) 
4 Levi (1996) appears to have similar doubts: “…If  people act trustfully, they tend to cooperate and invite cooperation in 
return. (…) However, the soccer clubs and bowling leagues  that are meant to produce such dense networks hardly seem up to the 
task. Certainly, they are not particularly useful agents of the kinds of sanctions and information that are necessary to promote 
large-scale economic exchange (p.47).  
5 Many experimental economists reach the same conclusions using game theory to represent social dilemmas 
or coordination problems. See among others, Van Huyck et al. (1990), Frazen (1995) and Holt (2005).    6 
Social capital is conceptually more useful when defined as an individual resource 
which can “secure benefits by virtue of membership in social network or other social structures” 
(Portes 1998, p.6). In this approach, what matters is not the number of relationships 
but the intensity and quality of social links established between individuals. These 
links are an important source of information, relevant for assessing new economic 
projects  and  improving  access  to  markets  but  also  representing  behavioural 
constraints, reciprocal duties and social rules to be respected. The presence of such 
links and incentives can have positive effects on the spread of cooperation at least 
within numerically circumscribed communities.  
In this approach, social capital is an individual resource given that it is based “on 
relationships between actors or between an individual actor and a group” (Portes 1998, p.18). 
The more the firm is identified with the individual, the greater the importance of 
social capital. In a small or very small company, entrepreneur behaviours can be 
affected  by  incentives  (information  and  social  relationships)  and  by  sanctions 
(exclusion and loss of  relational goods) regulating life in the community. It is hence 
likely that collective action between small firms is encouraged by the presence of 
social capital. It is however predictable that the variable will become decreasingly 
important as company size grows. 
 
4.THE ROLE OF INSTITUTIONAL VARIABLES AND EXPERIENCE OF ASSOCIATION  
In  the  previous  section  it  has  been  stressed  that  social  capital  in  relationships 
between  individuals  differs  from  social  capital  in  relationships  between  firms. 
Moreover, we should keep into account the role it plays with trust in the start up 
and continuation of cooperation. Kenworthy (1997) observes that, in most types of 
economic cooperation in industrialised countries (Kenworthy 1995), trust appears to 
be a useful but not essential precondition for start up of joint action and that the 
decisive variable are institutional incentives. Sakakibara (1997) observes that many 
research  consortia  in  Japan  are  based  on  governmental  organisations  supplying 
subsidies  and  different  types  of  incentive  at  the  beginning  and  development  of 
cooperation. The relevanty role of institutional action in promoting international 
cooperation projects, that have involved many European firms, has been discussed 
in many works (See for example Ormala 1993; Mothe and Quelin 2000, Benfratello,   7 
Schiantarelli  and  Sembenelli,  2007,  Ughetto,  2008,  Alessandrini,  Presbitero  and 
Zazzaro, 2008). 
This  paper  supports  this  line  of  thought  in  developing  a  framework  for 
interpretation that links firm propensity to collective action to institutional initiative 
and the accumulation of past experience of cooperation. 
The  basic  hypothesis  of  this  interpretative  model  is  that  local  (but  also  central) 
government institutions have a fundamental role in promoting both directly and 
indirectly supporting cooperation6. It also emphasises how the accumulation of past 
experience of collective action and, thus, the tradition of forming associations in 
business can be decisive in influencing the propensity to begin collective action. 
Both factors act jointly in two directions: a) raising positive expectations  connected 
to collective action and b) significantly lowering coordination costs which preceding 
and partly following the start up of cooperation. 
A high level of social capital as well as a detailed structure of civil society play a role 
in such framework. However, unlike the hypothesis prevailing in current debate, 
social capital and the widespread existence of social structures mark the absence of 
obstacles to collective action (cultural homogeneity, relative uniformity in income 
distribution and prevalence of social relationships based on horizontal reciprocity) 
rather than the presence of resources to generate economic cooperation.  
Focus on the role of institutional initiative and traditions of forming associations  is 
justified  by  the  fact  that  collective  action  between  economic  organizations  is 
hindered more by coordination problems than by free riding. Independent firms 
take  part  in  joint  action  as  there  are  advantages  of  strategic  complementarities. 
Arrighetti and Guenzi (2000) argue that such advantages lie in the provision of club 
goods such as defining technical standards, regulation of different forms of contract, 
acquiring  information  on  foreign  markets,  access  to  technological  services,  joint 
research  and  development  programmes  and  centralised  purchase  of  inputs  for 
production.  
For these goods,  the  higher  the number of  participants,  the differences in their 
contribution and  the increase in technology  available, the higher the number of 
viable solutions. It is only possible to start up collective action when one of the 
                                                            
6 See also Camagni (2007).   8 
possible  equilibria  has  been  selected  and  the  problem  of  coordination  has  been 
solved. Often this is possible only when firms sustain high costs of gathering and 
communicating  data,  identifying  potential  members,  comparing  and  selecting 
alternative  options,  defining  and  maintaining  the  organisational  structure  of  the 
project. Solving coordination problem rather than regulation affects the start up of 
collective action, and the cost of identifying the optimum solution influences final 
outcome (Arrighetti and Seravalli 1999a). So any solution which lowers coordination 
costs increases the chance of success of collective action. 
Institutions, for a number of reason, are able to act in this direction 7. By their very 
nature,  institutions  (particularly  local  institutions  such  as  regional  government, 
business associations, chambers of commerce and training colleges, etc.)  have the 
function  of  centralised  coordination.  Internal  resources  for  inter-organisational 
coordination are available to them more than to single actors (firms) taking part less 
frequently in collective action. And unlike private actors, their opportunity cost for 
defection  or  leaving  collective  action  is  zero  or  negative.  The  benefits  that 
institutions gain from collective action mainly consist of legitimisation or consensus, 
and  they  can  be  only  gained  by  continuing  collective  action.  Withdrawing  from 
collective action may be advantageous for a single company, but for an institution it 
would mean losing its influence and role. Lastly, negative payoffs for defection and 
the  non  participation  in  direct  economic  benefits  of  collective  action  allow 
institutions to ensure equity in allocating advantages of collective action. So the 
presence  of  a  third  institutional  party  in  a  cooperative  relationship  can  help  to 
prevent failure of the joint action, increasing the stability of  the collective action 
over time by pushing forward “the shadow of the future” (Axelrod 1984). 
Institutions can act to lower coordination costs by directly taking part in the project 
or  by  promoting  start  up.  But  they  have  an  equally  important  role  in  defining 
“external”  incentives.  They  can  provide  monetary  benefits  for  the  creation  of 
cooperation structures. They can allow access to resources as long as applicants are 
a group or cluster of companies, rather than a single company. They can also order 
their agenda with the aim of satisfying requests presented collectively and give lower 
priority  to  requests  by  single  firms.  And  finally  government  institutions  can 
                                                            
7 See Arrighetti e Guenzi (2000) for further details.   9 
encourage collective action (not only in business) by legitimising organisations that 
promote  cooperation  (such  as  cultural  associations  or  interest  representative 
associations) or contributing to their running costs. 
As  well  as  institutional  initiative,  accumulation  of  past  experience  of  collective 
action spurs new initiatives in the present. 
It affects first of all the expectations of success. Benefits and costs of collective 
action are not certain, but they are subject to risk assessment. The expectations of 
success can hence play a positive role in the decisions of individual actors as to 
whether it is opportune to be involved or not. Positive expectations lead a higher 
number of actors to undertake collective action, not defecting from agreements. 
And  this  increases  the  probability  that  collective  action  will  be  successful, 
confirming and strengthening the positive esxpectations.  
Expectations of success of collective action are also a positive function of their 
accumulation over time. Woolcock (1998) observes this link over time “… the very 
success of collective action itself influences the various types of social relations coordinating that 
success in the future” (p.168) 8. In areas where there is a historical memory of collective 
actions,  actors  tend  to  have  positive  expectations  of  results,  there  is  higher 
participation and there is less opportunism. Ostrom too reaches similar conclusions 
analysing  collective  experiences  of  co-production.  Initial  investment  of  time  to 
coordinate new projects and reach necessary consensus is high “but these serve as 
demonstration projects for others to see and understand the process. The process speeds up once 
residents can see how alternative designs work  and talk with others who have successfully obtained 
services (Ostrom 1996; p.1075)9.  
The accumulation of experience of collective action also affects success through 
learning and skills. Collective action is a process of institutional and organisational 
construction requiring specific skills and knowledge in each phase.  Selecting the 
optimum project, involving potentially interested subjects, identifying norms and 
procedures  and  fixing  sanction  mechanisms  are  all  complex  tasks.  Such 
                                                            
8 Hirshmann (1984) makes similar observations from a different point of view. He notes that although there 
are exceptions, failure of collective action tends to cause individuals to opt out of joint action and makes 
them less likely to take part in subsequent projects.  
9 The result of collective action affects its spread to other different sectors. See Ostrom :“the experience of success 
of coproduction also encourages citizens to develop other horizontal relationships and social capital (Ostrom 1996; p.1083).   10 
competences can be learned over time and are shown to be linked with the historical 
tradition that different areas have in cooperation 10. 
Lastly, several of Ostrom’s (1990) observations are particularly important in this 
context.  Among  factors  influencing  the  efficient  management  of  large  scale 
common property resources there is the “nested enterprises” principle. A high number 
of participants represents a relevant obstacle to collective action for individuals and 
firms  but  it  can  be  partly  solved  when  “larger  organizational  units,  …,  are  built  on 
previously organized smaller units”. In fact,  “once the smaller units are organized, the marginal 
costs of building on that organizational base is substantially less than the cost of starting with no 
prior  base”(p.189).  Ostrom  shows  that  this  can  be  reversed:  using  learning 
accumulated by managing collective action, pre-existing medium – large companies 
themselves  generate  much  smaller  new  initiatives  that  may  be  in  the  same  or 
different and connected field of activity. 
So we can hypothesise that widely consolidated intermediate institutions (such as 
business  associations  or  small  enterprise  or  artisan  organisations)  may  have 
contributed  to  the  spread  of  cooperative  initiatives  among  members  and  to 
increasing  propensity  to  collective  action  in  their  areas  by  replicating  their  own 
experience of organisation and by lowering start up and coordination costs among 
their local members.  
  
 
5. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
The empirical verification has been carried out using three models with the gradual 
introduction of proxies of technological hypothesis, social capital and the role of 
institutions. The introduction of these last two variables is an innovation for the 
studies in this field.  
 
                                                            
10 Hardin (1993), has also demonstrated that particularly in economic decisions the choice to cooperate is 
affected by learning and tends to be path dependent. Subjects less inclined to collective action will invest little 
and will have limited experience. So the chances of success will be lower and initial failure expectations will 
have place and initial expectation will be confirmed.  The opposite is true of subjects with a high propensity 
to cooperate; they will have more information available and will interact with more potential partners, so, they 
will be able to assess new opportunities and take part in profitable ventures. Success will then confirm that 
cooperation is economically advantageous. Explicit reference to learning function of collective action (in this 
case in civic society) is discussed in Hadenius and  Uggla (1996). The authors emphasise that socialisation to 






PAC= propensity of firms towards collective action (i=1,…,88 provinces); 
IND=relative incidence of employment by manufacturing and service industries (s = 1,…, n=industry); 
SIZE=relative incidence of employment by category of company size (v = 1,…, n =category of size); 
CS=social capital; 
ASSOC= level of membership of non - business associations; 
IST=level of activity of institutions; 
EAP=accumulation of experience of collective action between firms; 
FIN=: financial incentives to inter-firm collective action. 
 
 
The first model uses the standard technological and structural variables, alone. The 
second adds variables of social capital and of the spread of civic networks, while the 
third equation adds variables of institutional action and accumulation of experience 
of associations.  
Empirical tests are based on regression equations where the dependent variable is a 
proxy of propensity to firm cooperation at the level of local production systems in 
Italy (Italian province) at the beginning of the 1990s. 
 
The dependent variable 
The  propensity  to  participate  in  formal  collective  action  between  firms  was 
approximated  to  the  LOGCON  variable.  This  was  calculated  on  the  basis  of 
information  contained  in  the  Seventh  General  Census  of  Industry  and  Services 
(ISTAT 1994) and it is constructed as logarithm of the percentage ratio between the 
number of firms in the manufacturing and service industry involved in associations 
or consortia with other firms or institutions and the total number of firms (in the i-
th province) in 199911 (IMPCON)12.   
                                                                                                                                                                          
 
11 The logarithm form was necessary because of  outliers in the distribution. 
12 This variable, like all the others in this calculations contains 88 observations of provinces rather than 103. It 
has been in fact necessary to aggregate by region data from those provinces created after the 1950s and for 
which some of the indicators could not be established individually. This has been done for provinces in the 
regions of Friuli Venezia Giulia, Molise and Sardinia.  Secondly figures from provinces created after 1995, 
Biella, Verbano-Cusio-Ossola, Lodi, Lecco, Rimini, Prato, Crotone and  Vibo Valentia were aggregated with 
those provinces to which they belonged before 1995, Vercelli, Novara, Milano, Como, Forlì, Firenze and  
Catanzaro in that order. For the province of Lecco, which was formerly partly in the Como region and partly 
in Bergamo, we aggregated figures with Como, following custom.   12 
 
Variables of technology and size hypothesis 
In  order  to  measure  the  impact  of  technological  factors  on  firm  propensity  to 
collective  action,  a  series  of  indicators  of  industry  specialisation  of  production 
systems at province level have been calculated. For the manufacturing industry, it 
has been adopted Pavitt’s classification (1984) which identifies four groupings of 
industrial activity characterised by differentiated level of technology.  
The following indicators were calculated: PV_TRA for the traditional industry  13; 
PV_SCA for the sectors characterised by increasing return of scale14; PV_SUPP for 
specialized suppliers15 and  PV_SCI for the technology intensive industry 16. 




where a i,j  is the number of employed people in the province i in industry j, aj is the 
number of employed people in Italy in industry j, ai is the number of employed 
people in province i and a is the number of employed people in Italy.  
Pavitt’s classification does not include the building and construction industry or the 
service industry, but the same formula has been used to obtain four more industry 
indicators:    COMM  for  the  trade  industry,  COSTRUZ  for  building  and 
construction,  ENERG  for  energy  distribution  and  SERV_INT  for  all  activities 
connected to securities, estate and financial intermediation and informatics. 
The  second  group  of  indicators  is  aimed  at  measuring  the  relative  incidence  of 
classes of different firm size on the local production structure. Three size indicators 
(DIM)  have  been  set  up  (1  –  10  employees,  10  –  20  employees  and  over  20 
employees). 
                                                            
13 In Pavitt’s classification the traditional sector included mining, food and tobacco clothing and textiles, 
wood and building materials, metalworking, furniture, toys and other manufacturing. These variables are 
taken  from  the  ISL  data  bank  compiled  by  the  Economic  Science  Section,  Economics  Department,  
University of Parma. 
14 Pavitt’s “scale intensive” sector includes sugar cane processing, papermaking, printing and publishing, coke 
and refinery of nuclear fuels, chemicals, metal derived products, manufacture of domestic appliances radios 
and communications instruments, car and vehicle manufacture. 
15 Specialized suppliers include paint and varnish production, plastics, non-metal mineral derived products, 
machinery, industrial machinery, optic and precision tools, watches, cameras and sports equipment.  
 
S i,j = (a i,j / a j) / (a i / a  )   13 
The indicators were calculated as a ratio between employees in the size class itself 
and total employees in the province.  
 
Social capital variable  
The civicness variable has been calculated on the basis of indicators used by Putnam 
(1993a) to study the role that social capital has had in Italy at different levels of 
institutional performance. 
The indicator CAPSOC17 was constructed using factor analysis of three variables, 
LETT65, REFER74 and PREF_AV.  
LETT65  expresses  the  percentage  of  the  total  population  reading  newspapers, 
magazines,  books  or  other  material  not  linked  to  their  employment  in  1965.  It 
shows the cultural level of the population. REFER74 is calculated as a percentage of 
population with the right to vote and who voted in the 1974 referendum. It shows 
the  level  of  commitment  and  social  participation.  Lastly,  PREF_AV  shows  the 
propensity to understand patronage in politics through preferential voting. It is the 
simple arithmetical average of preferential votes, out of total votes, in the national 
elections of 1953, 1958 and 196318. 
As well as social capital, a variable showing the propensity of the individual to join 
various  associations  (excluding  business  associations)  has  been  included.  The 
objective was to verify the existence of a link between associations in civic society 
and actual propensity of economic agents to cooperate. Factor ASSOC_919 is an 
estimate of the spread of association membership in the 1990s and it was calculated 
on factor analysis of the following variables: ASTOT_9, the percentage incidence of 
                                                                                                                                                                          
16 The high tech sector includes pharmaceuticals, office machinery and computers, medical and precision 
instruments and aircraft manufacture. 
17 Table A in the appendix shows the factor analysis of  CAPSOC. 
18 Using indicators from the 1960s and 1970s to construct CAPSOC to calculate a variable of institutional 
efficiency in the 1990s solves a problem of endogenity and allows us to draw conclusions on possible cause-
effect dynamics between the two variables. It seems opportune however to check whether over time the 
dimension and spread of social capital has varied compared to the 1970s. We therefore attempted to update 
the CAPSOC variable using more recent data and a new factor was constructed using social capital indicators 
taken from the literature (Cf. Nuzzo, G. and Micucci, G. (2003) ) and it was correlated with our CAPSOC 
variable. The variables used for factor analysis are proxies of participation in voluntary non profit activities 
(the number of voluteers in nonprofit organisations per 100.000 population, 2000), of blood donors  (number 
of containers of blood donated per million of the population to the Italian Association of Voluntary Blood 
Donors, 1995) and the turnout rate for regional (Percentage of voters out of the total electorate, various years 
in the 1990s). This test proved the factor to be consistent and adeguate, and significantly correlated with 
CAPSOC (R = 0, 639; Barlett test = 53,220; χ
2 (DF=3) = 0,644) 
19 Table B in the appendix shows the factor analysis of ASSOC_9.   14 
private  associations  (like  social,  cultural,  recreational  and  sports  clubs)  on  the 
population of the province20 and ASVOL_9, showing the percentage incidence of 
voluntary associations on  the population of the province. 21 
 
Institutional variables 
Institutional activism was approximated to several elements of the initiative and the 
rooting  of  intermediate  institutions  in  local  economies.  Basic  variables  refer  to 
different types of intermediate institutions which recent publications22 show to have 
had  a  significant  influence  on  local  development  (local  banks,  chambers  of 
commerce, technical schools, municipality and province administrations).  
The summarising indicator used is ISTIT23 which is based on a factor analysis of the 
following variables: BP, SPESTRUT, RTEC51, FACAM and LOGCAM.   
BP is the degree of importance of local banks in the province economy in 1960. It is 
calculated as a percentage ratio between the sum of investments in local banks and 
the  sum  of  total  investments  in  credit  institutions  multiplied  by  the  degree  of 
specialisation  in  the  province  in  manufacturing  industry.  SPESTRUT  is  a 
measurement  of  the  efforts  made  by  local  institutions  to  encourage  economic 
development by supplying public goods such as infrastructures and education. It 
represents  the  ratio  between  municipality  expenditure  on  education  and  public 
works  and  total  expenditure  on  ordinary  administration  at  the  beginning  of  the 
1960s. RTEC51 represents the supply of technical education in excess of the level 
of  industrialisation  of  the  area.  The  variable  is  calculated  on  the  basis  of  non-
standardised  residuals  of  the  regression,  making  the  1950  rate  of  technical  and 
professional education dependant on the percentage of employed in the industry 
compared to the total of employed. FACAM is expression of the age and capacity 
for promotional initiative of the Chambers of Commerce and is obtained from a 
factor  analysis  of  CAM1  (ratio  between  number  of  chamber  meetings  and  total 
number of firms recorded in 1951) and CAM2 (which is a dummy variable with 0 
for  provinces  where  no  chamber  of  commerce  existed  before  1862  and  1  for 
                                                            
20 Cf. ISTAT (2001).  
21 Cf. Frisanco and Ranci (1999). 
22 Cf. Arrighetti and Seravalli (1999b) and Arrighetti, Seravalli and Wolleb (1999). 
23 Table C in the appendix shows the factor analysis of ISTIT.  
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provinces where there was one). LOGCAM shows the actual level of activity of the 
Chamber of Commerce and is calculated as  a logarithm of  the percentage ratio 
between the number of times the Chamber took part in capital and other ventures 
and the number of member firms recorded in 1997. 
Variables on past experience of firm associating are summarised in factor ASSIMP. 
This is derived from the main components analysis of five variables24: TART70, 
which is the rate of membership of artisan associations in 1970, calculated as the 
ratio  between  the  number  of  members  and  the  number  of  artisan  companies 
enrolled in the relative Register; VOTALB70 indicating the degree of participation 
elections of province committees of the organisations and is calculated as the ratio 
between total valid votes of members and the total of members enrolled on the 
register in 1970; COOP51AD showing the share of employees in cooperative firms 
of  total  employees  from  the  1951  ISTAT  survey;  AGCO70Q  showing  the 
percentage share of farms conveying to agricultural cooperatives or similar over the 
total  of  farms  existing  in  1970  (ISTAT  1974).  Lastly  AFID74,  a  dichotomous 
variable  which  is  1  for  provinces  where  there  existed  a  consortium  of    loan 
guarantees before or during 1974, and 0 for provinces where, on the other hand, it 
did not. 
Another  variable  (FINCON),  measuring  the  sum  of  financial  intervention  for 
collective action made by public institutions, has been added to the model. It has 
been her used funding given from Regional authorities to consortia in the period 
1992 – 1994, divided by the number of firms being members of associations or 
consortia in each region. Unfortunately, as there was lack of data on provinces, the 
same value had to be assigned to those within a given region. 
 
6. EMPIRICAL VERIFICATION 
Linear regression has been used to estimate equations to relate firm propensity to 
associate in different provinces of Italy with proxies as described above. 
The first step (Table 1; Equation 1) has been that of verifying the hypothesis on the 
impact of technological innovation and company size on propensity to collective 
action.  The  results  show  a  positive  and  significant  link  between  propensity  to 
                                                            
24 Table D in the appendix shows the factor analysis of ASSIMP.   16 
collective action and specialisation in informatics and intermediaries (SERV_INT) 
and specialised suppliers (PV_SUPP). 
The  coefficients  of  the  variable  (DIM_3),  measuring  the  relative  incidence  of 
medium large firms, are also, as expected, positive and significant. This is consistent 
with the line that the propensity to start up collective action is a direct function of 
firm size. But contrarily to what expected, as far as the hypothesis of technology is 
concerned  no  positive  relationship  is  found  between  technological  research 
intensive industries (Equation 2) (PV_SCI) and propensity to cooperate. 
The second step of verification (Equation 2) measures the influence of social capital 
variables (CAPSOC) and association variables (ASSOC_9).25 
Calculations confirm the hypothesis of social capital: widening the interpretative 
framework and introducing proxies of civicness and structures in society shows that 
these have a positive influence on the spread of cooperation. 
The last step  (Equation 3) verifies how the  model can be extended  by  proxy 
variables  of  institutional  action  (ISTIT)  and  how  the  proxy  variable  of  past 
experience of associations (ASSIMP) changes the picture. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
 
25  Calculations  not  included  here  verified  the  impact  of  the  civic  society  variable  in  the  early  1980s 
(ASSOC_8,  average  number  of  private,  social  cultural,  recreation  and  voluntary  associations  per  100000 
population in 1982). This variable did not prove significant.    17 
Table 1 
Regressions of LOGCON (propensity of firms to take initiative in collective action) - (Student t 
shown in brackets). 
 
Variables  Equation 1  Equation 2  Equation 3 








































































ASSIMP      0.155*** 
(4.810) 
ISTIT      7.102E-02** 
(2.011) 
R2a  0.413  0.654  0.749 
F  7.801*** 
 
15.955***  19.590*** 
 
NOTE: Number of observations = 88 ; *** = significance at 1%; ** = significance at 5%; * = significance at 10% 
 
KEY: 
PV_TRA= share of province employment in ‘traditional’ industries; 
PV_SCA= share of  province employment in industries characterised by increasing returns of scale; 
PV_SUPP= share of province employment in specialized suppliers; 
PV_SCI= share of province employment in science based manufacturing industries; 
ENERG= share of province employment in energy production and service industries; 
COSTRUZ= share of province employment in building and construction industries ; 
COMM: share of province employment  in trade and hotels; 
SERV_INT=  share  of  province  employment  in  activities  connected  to  building,  estate  monetary,  financial  intermediation  and 
informatics computer hire; 
DIM_3= percentage incidence of employment in medium large enterprises (more than 20 employees) on total province employment; 
CAPSOC= social capital proxy; 
ASSOC_9= proxy of social and cultural associations ; 
ISTIT= proxy of level of activity of intermediate institutions. 
ASSIMP= proxy of accumulated experience of associations by businesses; 
FINCON= funding supplied by regions for consortia. 
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The  results  show  an  increase  in  the  explained  variance  and  several  important 
changes in the coefficients of independent variables. Specifically, the variables of 
sector specialisation (PV_SUPP and SERV_INT) are no longer significant, and 
neither is the proxy of individual association (ASSOC_9). Social capital (CAPSOC) 
shows a decreasing significance. On the other hand, the variables of the level of 
institutional  initiative  and  past  experience  of  business  associations  show  a 
considerable explicative capacity26.  
The results thus show that institutional action and accumulation of past experience 
of economic association play a fundamental role in influencing the propensity to 
inter-firm action.27 28. 
The second part of the empirical analysis verified the three models according to 
different  classes  of  company  size29  30.  The  aim  is  that  of  finding  out  whether 
company size is a determinant of the propensity to collective action. Table 2 shows 
estimates on propensity to collective action by the class of smallest companies, 
with 10 or less employees. The results appear to be consistent with the general 
model.  
                                                            
26 The variable of financing of cooperative activity did not prove significant (FINCON). 
27 It was thought opportune to test the robustness of the results using Levine and Renelt’s method (1992), 
which determines through intervening variables the minimum limits of coefficients where they retain the 
same polarity and statistical significance. The test, shown in Table E in the Appendix, demonstrates that the 
variables are robust. The autonomous explicative capacity of the institutional action and business association 
variables was also verified. Calculations of a model the same as Equation 3 where the social capital variables 
and civic sense confirm all the conclusions. 
28 It could be objected that institutional and accumulation of experience variables are in fact proxies of social 
capital and should be interpreted as such. This hypothesis was verified and found to be false in Arrighetti, 
Lasagni and Raimondi (2001).  
29 In other words, the dependent variable comprises the propensity to participate in consortia / associations 
of firms belonging to the size group.  
30 Note that except for the indicators of sector specialisation, the other regressors are identical to those used 
in Table 1.   19 
Table 2 
Regressions of LOGCON_1 (propensity of firms with 10 or less than 10 employees to take 
initiative in collective action) - (Student t shown in brackets). 
Variables  Equation 1  Equation 2  Equation 3 


































































ASSIMP      0.137*** 
(4.215) 
ISTIT      8.054E-02** 
(2.204) 
R2a  0.361  0.531  0.642 
F  7.131***  10.864***  12.980*** 
 
NOTE: Number of Observations = 88; *** = significant at 1%;** = significant at 5%;* = significant at 10% 
 
KEY: 
PV_TRA_1= share of province employment in ‘traditional’ industriess (calculated for firms with 10 or less than 10 employees) 
PV_SCA_1= share of  province employment in industriess characterised by increasing returns of scale (calculated for firms with 10 or 
less than 10 employees) 
PV_SUPP_1= share of province employment in specialized suppliers (calculated for firms with 10 or less than 10 employees) 
PV_SCI_1= share of province employment in science based manufacturing industriess (calculated for firms with 10 or less than 10 
employees) 
ENERG_1= share of province employment in energy production and service industriess (calculated for firms with 10 or less than 10 
employees) 
COSTRUZ_1= share of province employment in building and construction industriess (calculated for firms with 10 or less than 10 
employees) 
COMM_1= share of province employment  in trade and hotels (calculated for firms with 10 or less than 10 employees) 
SERV_INT_1= share of province employment in activities connected to building, estate monetary, financial intermediation and 
informatics computer hire (calculated for firms with 10 or less than 10 employees) 
CAPSOC= social capital proxy; 
ASSOC_9= proxy of social and cultural associations ; 
ISTIT= proxy of level of activity of intermediate institutions. 
ASSIMP= proxy of accumulated experience of associations by businesses; 
FINCON= funding supplied by regions for consortia. 
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Equation 1 reveals the importance of industry specialisation in specialised suppliers 
(PV_SUPP_1), information technology and financial services (SERV_INT_1). No 
statistically significant link is shown between the propensity of small enterprises to 
cooperate  and  the  local  system  specialisation  in  high  technology  intensive 
industriess. 
Equation 2 shows that the relevance of sector variables falls if indicators of civicness 
(CAPSOC)  and  membership  of  associations  (ASSOC_9)  are  inserted.  Lastly 
Equation 3, where institution proxies are added, confirms the previous results. The 
model gains further explicative capacity, as important variables are proxies of the 
role of local institutions (ISTIT), the accumulation of membership of economic 
associations (ASSIMP), while both social capital (CAPSOC) and ‘civic’ association 
membership (ASSOC_9) lose some relevance31.  
Table 3 shows figures for enterprises with less than 20 employees. The results are 
similar to those of smaller enterprises. There is however a significant reduction in the 
explained variance.  
Lastly, table 4 shows the calculations for medium-large companies employing more 
than 20 people. 
The results could give ground to a different interpretation and show that analysing 
medium-large  companies  and  smaller  ones  require  different  interpretational 
methods. For large firms, inserting social capital and institutional variables (except 
for  FINCON)  does  not  significantly  improve  the  model.  Their  propensity  to 
cooperate appears to be basically determined by technological and organisational 
factors approximated to sector specialisation. Note the coefficients of traditional 
industry (PV_TRA_3), energy (ENERG_3), information technology and financial 
services, as well as research intensive sectors (PV_SCI_3) which however have a 
different sign from that predicted. 
 
                                                            
31 There is substantial similarity in the general estimates of propensity to collective action and those of small 
firms, because of the preponderance of small firms in almost all production systems in Italy.   21 
Table 3 
Regressions  of  LOGCON_2  (propensity  of  firms  with  no  more  than  20  employees  to  take 
initiative in collective action) - (Student t shown in brackets). 
 
Variables  Equation 1  Equation 2  Equation 3 


































































ASSIMP      0.149*** 
(4.765) 
ISTIT      7.517E-02** 
(2.182) 
R2a  0.164  0.350  0.535 
F  3.127**  5.676***  8.704*** 
 
NOTE: Number Of observations = 88;  *** = significant at 1%; ** = significant at 5%; * = significant at 10% 
 
KEY : see Table  2 
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Table 4:  
Regressions of LOGCON_3 (propensity of firms with more than 20 employees to take 
initiative in collective action) - (Student t shown in brackets). 
 
Variables  Equation 1  Equation 2  Equation 3 


































































ASSIMP      4.631E-02 
(1.023) 
ISTIT      1.058E-02 
(0.231) 
R2a  0.387  0.403  0.428 
F  7.877***  6.883***  5.999*** 
 
NOTE: Number of Observation = 88; *** = significant at 1%;** = significant at 5%;* = significant at 10% 
 
KEY: see Table 2 
 
 
The  evidence  shows  that  collective  action  between  small  enterprises  is  strongly 
influenced by both local institutional initiatives and the spread of the capacity to run 
joint projects. The existence of inclusive institutions angled towards the supplying 
of local public goods and the accumulated experience of economic association as 
well as social  capital seem to significantly influence the decisions to cooperate of 
smaller enterprises, by lowering coordination costs and linking new initiatives to 
previous ones. In this context technological variables play a marginal role because of 
the few skills accumulated and the low level of managerial resources that smaller 
enterprises have. Joint initiatives between smaller enterprises develop smoothly if an   23 
external subject provides a management infrastructure able to keep coordination 
costs under control and maintain the net benefits of  collective action. 
For larger companies such restrictions are not so important. As they have access to 
a higher level of management and administrative resources, these companies are 
able to provide infrastructure of coordination and regulation of collective action 
autonomously.  The  incentive  for  collaboration  lies  in  technological  and 
organisational factors and in the contribution each company can make to collective 
benefit. If the advantage of collective action lies in differentiated know how and 
sharing of specialised resources, as this findings confirm, it is the sectorial variables 
playing a crucial role in their decision to cooperate. The role of institutions, social 
capital  and experience of cooperation tends to be unimportant or irrelevant.  
 
7. CONCLUSIONS 
We can draw different hypotheses on inter firm collective action. This paper has 
attempted to verify whether the propensity to collective action can be explained 
using  the  traditional  hypotheses  of  technological  and  organisational  factors.  We 
have also attempted to verify the explicative capacity of recent models relating the 
spread of inter firm cooperation with resources of social capital, the intensity of 
institutional action and past experience of association. 
Calculations show that technology is an important variable only as far as large firms 
are concerned.  More generally and especially for smaller enterprises, they show that 
the spread of collective action  is coherent with a model based on variable of social 
capital, especially proxies of institutional activity and the accumulation of economic 
association experiences.  




TABLE A: SUMMARIZING VARIABLE OF SOCIAL CAPITAL ( FACTOR ANALYSIS FOR CAPSOC) 
 
a. Description statistics 
    MIN  MAX  AVERAGE  STD. DEV 
 
LETTUR65 








PREF_AV    45.2  196.2  107.96  47.83 
REFER74    67.6  96.2  87.69  7.38 
           
 
b. Pearson matrix of correlation coefficients  
    LETTUR65  PREF_AV  REFER74 
 
LETTUR65 





PREF_AV    -0.749(**)  1   
REFER74    0.707(**)   -0.815(**)  1 
         
 









PREF_AV  -0.935 
REFER74  0.920 
   
 
BARLETT TEST:   
χ
2 APROX. (3 DEGREE OF FREEDOM)  168.8( ** ) 
KMO TEST:  0.738 
% OF VARIANCE  83.84 
 
Source: ISL Data Bank– Section of Economic Sciences – University of Parma. 
Note: ** Significant at 0.01 * Significant at 0.05 
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TABLE  B:  SUMMARIZING  VARIABLE  OF  COOPERATION  BETWEEN  INDIVIDUALS(  FACTOR 
ANALYSIS FOR ASSOC_9)  
 
a. Description statistics 
    MIN  MAX  AVERAGE   STD. DEV. 
 
ASTOT_9 








ASVOL_9    0.033  0.166  0.021  0.013 
           
 
b. Pearson matrix of correlation coefficients 
      ASTOT_9  ASVOL_9 
 
ASTOT_9 
     
1 
 
ASVOL_9      0.511( ** )  1 
         
 














BARLETT TEST:   
χ
2 APROX.  (1 DEGREE OF FREEDOM)  25.87 ( ** ) 
KMO TEST  0.5 
% of VARIANCE  75.55 
 
Source: ISL Data Bank– Section of Economic Sciences – University of Parma. 
Note: ** Significant at 0.01 * Significant at 0.05 
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TABLE  C:    SUMMARIZING  VARIABLE  OF  LEVEL  OF  ACTIVITY  OF  INTERMEDIATE 
INSTITUTIONS (FACTOR ANALYSIS FOR ISTIT) 
 
a. Description statistics 
    MIN  MAX  AVERAGE  STD.DEV. 
 
BP 








FACAM    -1  3  0  1 
RTEC51    -20  24  0  7.85 
SPESTRUT    0  1  0.48  0.14 
LOGCAM    -0.63  3.12  1.10  0.76 
           
 
b. Pearson matrix of correlation coefficients 






















FACAM    0.284( **)  1       
RTEC51    0.238 ( * )  0.297( ** )  1     
SPESTRUT    0.464( **)  0.262( * )  0.422( ** )  1   
LOGCAM    0.234 ( * )  0.310( ** )  0.399( ** )  0.388( ** )  1 
             
 
 










FACAM  0.605 
RTEC51  0.700 
SPESTRUT  0.767 
LOGCAM  0.688 
   
 
BARLETT TEST:   
χ
2 APROX. (10 DEGREE OF FREEDOM)  73.894( ** ) 
KMO TEST  0.73 
% of VARIANCE  46.59 
 
Source: ISL Data Bank– Section of Economic Sciences – University of Parma. 
Note: ** Significant at 0.01 * Significant at 0.05 
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TAB.D:  SUMMARIZING  VARIABLE  OF  PAST  EXPERIENCE  OF  ECONOMIC  ASSOCIATION 
BETWEEN FIRMS (FACTOR ANALYSIS FOR ASSIMP) 
 
a. Description statistics 
    MIN  MAX  AVERAGE  STD.DEV. 
 
TART70 








VOTALB70    0.25  0.75  0.50  0.115 
COOP51AD    0.49  15.54  2.97  2.63 
AGCO70Q    0.01  66.20  12.95  16.182 
AFID74    0  1  0.56  0.499 
           
 
b. Pearson matrix of correlation coefficients 






















VOTALB70     0.657( ** )  1       
COOP51AD     0.528( ** )  0.429( ** )  1     
AGCO70Q    0.440( ** )  0.271( * )  0.485( ** )  1   
AFID74    0.316( ** )  0.157  0.135( ** )  0.186  1 
             
 
 










VOTALB70  0.751 
COOP51AD  0.763 
AGCO70Q  0.677 
AFID74  0.408 
   
 
BARLETT TEST:   
χ
2 APROX. (10 DEGREE OF FREEDOM)  115.091( ** ) 
KMO TEST  0.71 
% of VARIANCE  50.5 
 
Source: ISL Data Bank– Section of Economic Sciences – University of Parma. 
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TABLE  E:  SENSIVITY  ANALYSIS  OF  COEFFICIENTS  –  EQUATION  OF  PROPENSITY  TO 
COLLECTIVE ACTION BETWEEN FIRMS 
 
Parameters  Lower estimation  Basic estimation 
     
ASSIMP  0.152  0.153 
t  5.2  5.3 
ISTIT  7E-02  7.7E-02 
t  2.3  2.7 
CAPSOC  0.116  0.127 
t  3.1  3.5 
ASSOC_9  NS  NS 
t     
FINCON  NS  NS 
t     
R
2a  0.742  0.745 
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